Turkey's relations with its neighbors have been steadily improving. Tense relations of the mid-nineties have been in stark contrast to good neighborly relations that Ankara has succeeded to cultivate with its contagious as well as second beit neighbors for the last fıve years. In order to grasp the reasons that paved the way for such an overall improvement, one has to look at two aspects of Turkish foreign policy: success in putting down the Kurdish insurgence and increasing prospects for accession to the EU. The dynamics of Turkish politics have transformed since Turkey received a status of candidacy in December 1999. Globalization, EU integration process and customs union brought about its own grinding effects over the prominence of traditional statecraft in Turkey. Vast spectrum of civic organizations is increasingly involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security sectar on a greater scale and thus becomes the agents of de-securitization process in Turkey. Their impact is becoming visible in debates as to how the national interest will be defined.
Turkey' s relations with its neighbors have been steadily improving. Tense relations of the mid-nineties have been in stark contrast to good neighborly relations that Ankara has succeeded to cultivate with its contagious as well as second beIt neighbors for the last fıve years. Amelioration of relations with Russia, Syria and Iran, former rivals for several reasons, are exemplary. The successive Turkish govemments seem to have held the common policy that the relations should be govemed by the principles of good neighborliness.
Trust, engagement and dialogue, rather than confrontation and containment, appear to be the leitmotivs of the present rhetoric. In order to grasp the reasons that paved the way for such an overall improvement, one has to look at two aspects of Turkish foreign policy: Success in putting down the Kurdish insurgence and increasing prospects for accession to the EV.
This artiele will take a eloser look at the reasons of the amelioration of relations with a number of troubled neighbors (Russia, Iran, and Syria) and to delineate the main elements of this transformation.
A Changing Environment
The end to the Cold War did not improve the security environment of Turkey. New generation of threats and challenges generated a broader security agenda for Ankara. Despite initially positive expectations, disintegration of the Soviet and Yugoslavian f~:lerations and, not the least, de facto partition of Iraq fueled increased insecurities in the vicinity of Turkey. \ Moreover, the great disintegration exacerbated Turkey's own Kurdish separatism and PKK's armed insurgence gained momentum after Baghdad's authority failed to function in Northern Iraq. Among the threats Ankara had to cope with, the Kurdish separatism created far greater insecurities for Turkey. It remained to be the epicenter of Turkey's ı"Doksanlı Yıııarda Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı," in Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, (eds.) En Uzun Onyıl, Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar, İstanbuL, Boyut, ı 998, p.ı 3-44. security concerns for the rest of the decade succeeding the Cold War. 2 Although it has reached to its climax after the Gulf War, the armed Kurdish insurgence had aıready begun to undermine the premises of C1assical inside-outside national security dichotomy in Iate 1980s. As the PKK began to operate more effectively within and outside Turkey, the military gradually assumed greater role to engage in curbing the armed insurgence. 3 "Asymmetrical"
and "non conventional threat" required the army to change its mindset, force structure, operational codes and even its inventory.4 In August 1989, the General Staff had delivered a landmark statement indicating that the threat was coming from within as well as outside Turkey. The decisions taken in the National Security Council's March 1990 meeting heralded new era in the struggle against the PKK. Accordingly, a governmental degree went into force in April 1990 taking extra measures to dea i with separatist threat. In 1992 the National Security Policy Document pinpointed Kurdish separatism as the major source of threat. 5 Notwithstanding increased troop deployment in the southeast Turkeyand active collaboration with the KOP to uproot the PKK in Northern Iraq, the army had considerable difficulty to contain the armed insurgence until it changed its overall strategy in July 1994.6 The Area Superiority Strategy required the army to have special training, different force structure and relevant equipment in dealing with the insurgence. By the mid of the decade fighting PKK took another step further when the TAF increased scale of the operations inside Iraq and began to deploy troops in the security beit formed along the border.
Given security measures tightened by the fırst half of the decade, politİcal issues pertinent to identity issues were rapidly oversecuritİzed. Thus, having precipİtated imposition of extra legal measures, the PKK insurgence eventually contributed to the further consolidation of security sector in Turkey.7 Throughout the nineties, the military had retained and expanded its central place within the security sector and its de facto authority over SFP issues. R lts influence became even more conspicuous when issues were concerned the armed forces' operational engagement. So, the more Turkey's securİty agenda widened, the greater became military's involvement in SFP issues. The military's role therefore became more perceptible, and in some cases uncomfortably coexİsts with the role of the elected government and foreign policy. Moreover, this occurred at a time when the EU was becoming more sensitiye to human rights issues as well as to whaı was caııed the shortcomings of democratic control of the militaries in candidatc countries, and did so al a time the sources and agents of SFP were becoming more pluralistic across Europe. Oversecuritİzation of Turkey's political system and transgressions of human rights were therefore bitterly critİcized by the ED. Against this backdrop, Ankara was not included among the new list of candidates for eventual membership at the Luxembourg summit of 12 December 1997. In the second half of the decade Turkey stepped up its efforts on the diplomatic front to cut off the PKK's logistics. By the early 1996, Ankara dropped its policy of critical dialogue with Syria calling for end to sponsor the PKK's activities within Syria and Lebanon. In a note delivered on 23 lanuary 1996. Ankara bluntly warned Damascus that its current policy would be retaliated in kind. Given the contjnuing Syrian indifference to continual Turkish warnings, the following months witnessed a great leap forward towards the improvement of bilateral relations with Israel in military affairs, which had aıready taken off in i993. The Military Training Cooperation Agreement of 23 February 1996, The Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement of 28 August 1996, strategic dialogue forums attended by the top SFP elite of respectiye countries, joint air and nava! exercises, and large scale modernization projects made the alignment the key stone of Ankara's peripheral strategy.11 Although the alignment, C1aimed Turkish authorities, had never been geared to take joint measures to check Syria, the agreements were perceived by the Arab countries as aciassical alliance forged against Syria in particular. So it became another source of irritation for Syria and Iran, whose efforts, however, to form a counter alliance proved futile in the rest of the decade. ı2
Syria
Historically speaking, Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastem neighbors were poisoned by a variety of issues. Yet, for Ankara the regionalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf War stood out as the most burning issue for several reasons. Its regionalization caused controversial outcomes/windfalls for all neighbours. While the creation of the state of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq brought these countries together in search of taking counter measures, they, almost with no exception, played the Kurdish card against the each other for a variety of purposes. Providing shelter, transportation and training facilities to the PKK and hosting its leader in Damascus for almost two decades, Syria's war by proxy against Turkey remained an excellent case.
Turkish Syrian relations remained soured particularly after 1984 when the PKK intensified its activities within Turkey. However, Ankara's policy was a critical dialogue with Damascus involving carrots rather than sticks. The protocols of July 1987 and April 1992 assuring Syria of regular down tlow of the Euphrates were Turkish efforts of the kind, yet with no tangible result. 13 However, after 1996 as a result of frustration with the Syrian indifference to Turkish demands, Ankara changed its policyand began to pressurize Damascus to stop its support for the PKK. Turkish policy was two fold: lt stepped up its efforts to contain the Syrian policy first by forging closer diplomatic military relations with Israel, secondly by resorting to the threat of use of force more often lest Damascus ended its support for the PKK. In a note to Damascus delivered on 23 January 1996, Ankara made it c1ear that it retained the right to resort to self defensiye measures if Damascus failed to revise its policy as However, the tensian turned out to be a crisis in February 1997 when the Iranian ambassador Muhammad Bagheri attended to address an Islamist gathering called the Night for Jerusalem expressing critical views in public on Turkey's rapprochement with Israel and close relations with the US. It caused a diplomatic disaster triggering a crisis when both countries recalled their ambassadors mutually.24 it is beyand the scope of this paper to discuss details of motivations that played decisive role in shaping foreign policy towards Iran in the period of 1996-1999. However, one would maintain that Turkey's policy of confrontation of the period was driven by internal factorso The relations started to show the signs of gradual improvement after 1999. In 2002 revision of the NSPD, in comparison to the way it was mentioned in 1997 NSPD, Iran was covertly referred as a source of threat given Iran' s aspirations of development of nuclear power and WMD and its continued support for the PKK. Both countries realized that they could not effort to sustain the policy of tension during the period that prospects for US intervention to Iraq were looming large. The rapprochement was marked by the opening of pipeline construction of which raised concems and reactions from Washington to carry Iranian natural gas to Turkey.
Relations between Turkeyand
Iran 
Russia
By the fırst half of the decade Ankara's relations with the exfoe neighbor remained soured. The transition period after the collapse of the Soviet Union was govemed by contending approaches to a variety of regional issues. They were mostly articulated through a zero-sum mentality addressed in the context of geostrategic rivalry. However, the second half of the decade saw bilateral relations evolving into a different context, and living through a substantial transformation of the mutual perceptions. Two issues are of relevance to see the transformation: Firstly, in retaliation of Turkey's stance over the Chechen war, which broke out in 1994, Russia vigorously played the Kurdish card. As the Chechen leaders were given high level reception in Ankara, Russian authorities increasingly tolerated the PKK's activities in that country. Secondly, Turkey's will to foster special relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan caused uneasiness in Moscow. The route of main energy pipeline that would carry their crude oil and natural gas turned to be bone of contention putting these two countries at loggerheads. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline issue therefore soon after became the symbol of TurcoRussian rivalry. Later two countries had diverged views on the Turkish Straits' security. Turkey's efforts to provide security for its However, just as was the case with Iran, SFP elites in Moscow and Ankara rea1ized that zero-sum game approaches would bring about detrimental results for both countries. 28 The turnabout occurred in the aftermath of Russian Prime Minister Yiktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Turkey on 16-17 December 1997. The visit concluded the $30 billion natural gas deal called the Blue Stream envisaging Russia to supply large amount of natural gas through an underwater pipeline in the Black Sea, and to catch the lion's share in Turkey's growing natural gas market. It signaled new period that Turkey desired, expressed Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, "to cooperate rather than compete with its great neighbor". In this positive atmosphere, the Russian government resisted the pressure from the nationalist circles calling for giying asylum for Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK's leader who came to Russia after he was extradited from Syria in October 1998, deported him. 29 Turkey also contributed to the rapprochement lifting same of the limitations imposed by the 1994 Traffic Regulations. Moscow accepted the new regulation that was put in effect in 1998.
Prime Minister Ecevit' s visit of November 1999 bolstered the atmasphere of cooperation and displayed the level importance thaı Ankara attached to the improvement of bilateral relations. it aimed to foster cooperation against international terrorism, completion of technical formalities of the Blue Stream, and reinvigoration of economic relations. 30 More importantly, the visit took place at the heels of the Russian army's new offensive in Chechnya raising opposition within Turkey. On his occasion, Ankara adopted different approach than did it during the fırst Chechen war of 1994-1996 underscoring its support for the territorial integrity of Russia. Two respeetive governmental decrees of 26 September 2000 and 3 October 2000 were put in effect to severe the activities of the 'Caueasian Cheehen Solidarity Group', an umbrella organization coordinating wide ran ge of activities Caucasian diaspora organizations active in Turkey. Although the complaints on behalf of Russia continued since then, the tone and frequency of complaints have been far lower than were they before. 31 In addition to mutual political will on both sides, diversified relations as a result of inereasing trade volume, construction activities by Turkish fırms in Russia and growing number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey brought stabilizing impact on bilateral relations compelling both countries not to take harsh stances over the disputed issues. Recent developments are noteworthy in this respeel. In April 2004, when the Ajaria crisis broke out, Turkeyand Russia swiftly consulted each other and refrained from any intervention that could escalate the tension. In the following months both countries displayed mutual understanding and reached to compromise over the issue of pricing the natural gas coming through the Blue Stream. However, the signals that Moscow considers to take a more constructive approach for the BTCP are also noteworthy as far as the future course of relations is concemed. In December 200 i, the Russian giant oil company Lukdil called for dismiss of parochial approaches towards the BTCP that the Turkish straits would not be suitable for heavy tanker traffıc, and that expressed its interest to take part in the project or connecting BTCP with the existing BakuNovorossiysk pipeline. it would be overoptimistic to assume that 3IFor the texts of government deerees, see www.kafl<as.org.tr views of the two countries would no more diverge on such issues. However, it is a good omen that the arguments based on geostrategic rivalry have been loosing ground. 32 In this regards, the last visit paid by President Putin openly represented the changing agenda of the bilateral relations. 33 Changing Security Perceptions: Post-Helsinki Zeitgeist
The dynamics of Turkish politics have transformed since Turkey received a status of candidacy in December 1999. Increasing prospects of EU accession has been exerting tremendous impact on Turkish foreign policy. One can contend that the impact stemmed from different roots. First, in accordance with the EU's indination for vertical integration, Turkey's SFP environment has been diversified at an unprecedented pace. Turkish society has become more receptive to open debate as interest groups develop and, in return, theyare now far better organized to transmit their demands across Europe through peer associations accredited with the Union.
Increasing involvement of non-state actors in the formulation process of SFP in Turkey has become one of the novel aspects of the politics. As newly emerging yet strong actors begin to exert growing influence over SFP issues, the official apparatus has been losing its prominence in economic and financial affairs. 'Foreign policy below' or 'grass roots statecraft'34 has its own reflections in Turkey. Globalization, EU integration process and customs union brought about its own grinding effects over the prominence of traditional statecraft in Turkey. Yast spectrum of civic organizations is increasingly involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security sector on a greater scale and thus becomes the agents of desecuritization process in Turkey. Their impact is becoming visible in debates as to how the national interest will be defined. While these new actors put their weight behind those who propagated revisions in outstanding national issues, as was the case of Cyprus, the traditional circles fail to mobilize large sectors of society to support their own position. 35 lt was therefore not a coincidence that debate over national interest undermined state's position over one of the issues that was traditionally considered as major national cause, namely Cyprus. To put it in a nut shell, by the second half of the nineties the debate over Cyprus dramatically shifted the focus of the main argument that TAF was keeping its troops there for the sake of Turks [iving on the Island. The emphasis was rather put on that Turkey's presence there had been required for the sake of Turkey's own security needs. So the new paradigm required the issue be over-securitized further. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate the details of the Annan Plan, yet the end result was an impressive compromise among contending agents of SFP in Ankara. Compromise removed stumbling blocks giying more freedom of maneuverability to the new AKP Secondly, Ankara would definitely like to avoid any conflict with its neighbors because such a contingency would obviously butter the breads of those who claimed that Turkey's accession should be delayed on the grounds that its neighborhood was stiıı perilous. 36 Obviously, the way certain sections of Turkish polity stood against VS unilateralism as regards the Iraqi issue was boIstered, if not inspired by the EU's stand on the issue. 37 The Turkish position on Iran and Syria also seems influenced by Brussels. With EV accession in mind, observed an expert, Turkey wanted to treat its Middle Eastem neighbors la Europe. 38 So truly, given both Iran and Syria became de facto neighbors of the United States after the oecupation of Iraq, the treatment lı la Europe have paid more dividends in return. Therefore, the possibility of Turkey's unilateral intervention in regional affairs will be limited by further Europeanization of its SFP sector.
